Трансформація методологічних образів науки в логічних доказах постпозитивізму

Abstract

У статті аналізується процес зміни розуміння образу і смислу науки в аргументах постпозитивізму. Показана еволюція логіки формування концепту філософії науки від «парадигми» Т. Куна до множини конкуруючих «дослідницьких програм» І. Лакатоса.

The paper analyzes the process of changing the image and sense of science in the arguments of postpositivism. A logic of evolution of the concept of philosophy of science from a “paradigm” of T. Kuhn to set of competitive “research programs” of I. Lakatos. The article proves that science-centered tradition in philosophy of science a rationality carrier servesa science itself. Therefore, rationality is arguedwith special logicresearch of universal standards and procedures of knowledge justification, which is why it focuses on the canons of experimental methodology. Holistic adequate to the truthsof knowledge and reality, image of science is created by a historical school of philosophy of science;its main subject of study is a dynamics of scientifi c knowledge. In historical meta-methodologies proclaimed that the task of philosophy of science is the reconstruction of the “internal” history of science as opposed antihistorical interpretation of science in logical positivism. It is shown that from the perspective of a specific analysis of K. Popper, starting from critics verification (and more –inductivism in general), argues the rational development of science by “trial and error” with the elimination of falsified theories. “Alpha” and “Omega” of Popper’smethodology is a phenomenon of atheory as a set of universal statements and provisions, relating to all elements of the class. An important achievement of Karl Popper is the knowledge of the true meaning of two fundamental methodological principles– the principle of theoretical relativity and a principle of development of scientifi c knowledge. The concept of Kuhn on the role and importance of paradigmin ensuring of normal, cumulative development of science in the period between its noncumulative “jumps” – thescientific revolutions– wasa compelling argument for a new methodological orientation in scientific knowledge. To further development of methodology of scientifi c knowledge, which was carried out by representatives of the philosophy of science, more important was the concept of I. Lakatos. He offers a new version of “sophisticated” falsifi cationism, but with a refusal of the “elimination of regulatory requirements hypotheses” that were not checked by experience. Thus, the logic and arguments of postpositvism signifi cantly changed the direction of methodological research. Instead of the traditional argument on the importance of defining a subject and a method, a processing and a verification, the studies, that existing scientific schools and theories began rethink as research programs (paradigms), were put forward. The origin and evolution of these programs has been called into historical analysis and methodological reconstruction, including their desire to play “hard cores” and other components of the scientific performance evaluation in the context of the principle of “proliferation”.